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1.- Some Words About the Spanish Political System.
Our study of the Spanish political system just covers a short period of
eleven years, beginning in 1978 when the Spanish Constitution was approved. We
could extend this period of time up to one year if we considered that the new
system started with the first general elections after those held in February 1936.
There is no agreement among political scientists neither about the initial and final
moments of the Spanish transition1 from a dictatorship to a democratic political
system nor about the stability of the party system that resulted from this process.
Some writers consider the Spanish political system as a whole, with regional
subsystems2, and analyze it just within the left-right cleavage; others3 beli ve that
several political systems co-exist without being subordinated to the Spanish one.
In this latter sense we can consider that Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarra,
etc., have their own party systems mostly because the historical cleavage between
the center and the periphery has not been resolved.
There are certain features that differentiate the Spanish democratic political
system and its consolidation from all other systems in Western European
countries. In this paper, we will try to underline the most significant ones in order
to see how they relate to leadership and to the election of political party leaders.
During the 1960’s, Spain changed unlike any other First World country from
a pre-industrial to a post-industrial age without having had an industrial period4.
The crises of European parties generated alternative ways of political action, and
parties were compelled to adapt themselves to the new ideological and
organizational circumstances. After Franco’s death, the new political situation in
Spain, with some political parties coming out from clandestinity and others just
being founded, allowed for the development of the party system, that was to
become quite different from the European ones: the attempt to follow the classic
Duvergerian model, formally the mass parties’ model, contrasted with reality,
exclusively based on institutional functions and on the consensus of the first
democratic period (1977-79)5.
There were other factors that also conditioned the Spanish political system,
some specific to Spain and others shared with other Western countries. Spanish
political culture is characterized by low participation in organizations. In this
sense, civil society is not organized; even during Franco’s period just some few
specific groups -workers, students and civil movements- were active and strongly
rejected the dictatorial regime as a result of the Francoist strategy to provoke
political demobilization within the different strata of society6. At present, the only
articulated and meaningful channel of participation is the electoral one, with
elections (at various levels) being held almost every year7, with different turnouts
depending on the type of election and on the different geographic areas8.
Another important fact is that television, unlike in most other Western
countries, was already a consolidated media when the new Spanish political
system was established9. This implied that public opinion and, more specifically,
voters were less aware of the differences between the parties’ programs than of
the political leaders’ public image representing both the party and its program.
Although this process takes place in all Western democracies, we must also bear
in mind that broadcasting takes place in the authoritarian and very personalized
Spanish political culture.
2.- Party and Leadership. Models.
As a result of the specific features we have just seen, the organization of
the party system has been unstable and has been marked by internal disputes that
have provoked different situations:
— Disappearance of the party:
The most significant example is that of «Unión de Centro Democrático»
(UCD), an electoral coalition created around the President of the Government
using the Old Regime’s institutional mechanisms, winner of the first democratic
elections. The party disappeared from the political scene when its founding leader
left it10.
— Division of the party:
We will talk about two parties that solved their break up in different ways.
The crisis in the «Partido Nacionalista Vasco» (PNV) was caused by the
confrontation between the party leader and the President of the Basque
Government. As no solution seemed to exist to solve the conflicts among the
members of the power elite within the party, it broke up and the dissenting section
created a new party.
On the other hand, in the first two general elections the Partido Comunista
de España (PCE) failed in its hope to become the first party of the opposition on
the left. Santiago Carrillo controlled the two confronted currents in the party -the
Leninist and the Euro-Communist- until the 1979 Party Conference was faced with
the issue of ideological revisions and democratization within the party, both
currents becoming more obvious and radical. That was the origin of crises and
divisions that continue nowadays11.
— Processes of unstable coalition:
«Alianza Popular» (AP) aimed at organizing the right in Spain which was
-and still is- crumbled into pieces; Manuel Fraga and AP wanted to integrate part
of the Francoist right into the project of the new Spanish political system.
AP and its leader tried to organize a strong right wing alternative by
integrating prominent politicians and making coalitions with small parties,
especially during pre-electoral periods. The division of the right had a negative
effect: it meant the non-consolidation, and thus the instability of many coalition
processes 12.
— Party integration:
The «Partido Socialista Obrero Español» (PSOE) impelled a process for
the integration of all the different socialist options that were present in the first
general election. This is the only example of a process carried out satisfactorily in
the political system, being a positive point for the configuration of PSOE as a real
alternative to government13.
The focus of our research is based on the two main national parties: PSOE
and AP.
The unstable coalition differs from the integration model in a series of traits
that we will see as follows. In the first place, PSOE achieved the union of the
socialist political spectrum by integrating all the other socialist parties, whereas AP
was unable to integrate the right in one political force thus finding itself in a
permanent instability caused by its own forces.
Secondly, both hierarchy and internal cohesion were imposed in PSOE.
This was due perhaps to its leader’s ability to solve the complex internal situation
provoked by the presence at once of the historical leaders, some critics and many
young people that were just joining the party given the possibility of it becoming
the alternative to government. The highest point of this process was the 28th Party
Conference and the 1979 Extraordinary Conference14.
At the same time, two parallel and related processes were taking place in
AP. On the one hand, AP tried to establish a strong party organization, which
would be achieved in certain areas but not in all of them because of the difficulties
caused by the integration of the different clientele and personalities. On the other
hand, it started coalition processes with other parties and some leaders that,
coming from disappeared parties, entered its governing elite that implied a
constant re-adaptation of the selection and internal operation mechanisms.
In the third place, as a result of the two factors already mentioned Felipe
González remained as the indisputable and hegemonic socialist leader since his
election in 1974. On the other hand, AP’s leader Manuel Fraga gave special
importance to the first factor, that is, the hope to place all the right wing around his
party. This led to two temporary resignations and to an important renewal in the
party’s leadership as an attempt to articulate AP’s political option.
Finally, there is a strong leadership personality in both parties affecting the
inner as much as the outer party. In PSOE this role is positive both internally and
externally15. In AP the leader’s role is positive in order to keep the party together
but negative in relation to the second factor16. In both parties, the leader’s
influence imposes itself on the selection method17. Also in both of them, the two
models described above are exactly followed. That is, in spite of his party’s
instability, Manuel Fraga keeps his leadership in AP whereas Felipe González has
a stable leadership in the PSOE.
Thus far we have analyzed the external factors that affect the political
parties, or the influences they receive from the political system where they
operate. Let us now analyze the internal method to select and elect leaders in
those parties, although we’ll have to bear in mind that some of the questions
asked in this Working Paper do not have an easy answer, mainly because of the
short period it covers.
Selection Methods
We will basically talk about formal selection mechanisms; nevertheless we
think it would be interesting to complete this research in the future by determining
the importance of the political party’s elite. There is usually a tendency to identify
the party with its leadership and even with its national top man: this is also the
position we take in our study. We will point out the importance of the horizontal
dividing lines, the intermediate elites18 and their role in relation to the renewal of
the governing bodies: we will bear in mind that they could be leaders in the future.
In the Spanish situation, the parties’ crises (1978-79) and especially the change in
their structure and dynamics since 1982 influence the renewal of the elite. The
importance of mechanisms and formal selection procedures is conditioned by the
role the PSOE plays in the political system.
In AP, the strategy to develop the organization and coalition re-foundation
processes caused two temporary resignations of its leader and a high degree of
renewal within the party elite.
The predominance of PSOE in elected positions and the employment of its
members in large areas of government and public administration helped to
decrease the tensions within the party. It also influenced the composition and
renewal process of the party’s elite (ministers, presidents of autonomous
governments, etc.) in the Federal Committee Commission.
SELECTION METHODS USED IN PSOE
After the Civil War, Indalecio Prieto, a historic Spanish socialist leader, first
led PSOE followed by Rodolfo Llopis from 1944 to 1972. But there would be a
progressive alienation between the socialist party in exile and the members of the
party who lived in Spain, due to the differences in their respective views and
analyses of Spanish politics. The final party break up took place during the 12th
Party Conference held in Toulouse in 1972. The in-country members succeeded in
turning the General Secretariat into an executive body, the first step in promoting
Felipe González as party leader. This was finally achieved at the 13th Conference
held in Suresnes in 1974 when the in-country members imposed themselves on
the members in exile and obtained the control of the party’s leadership. Jorge de
Esteban and Luis López Guerra stated in their book: “in fact, the call for the
celebration of the 12th Conference in 1972 was not carried out legally as it was not
announced by the right person (Rodolfo Llopis, the party’s Secretary General) but
by Nicolás Redondo, who was not entitled to do so.” It was a successful «coup
d’état» in the party’s organization. The «orthodox» Conference took place in
December of the same year, this one summoned by Llopis. So it is difficult to
determine who divided PSOE, the renewed or the «historic» leaders. The latter
had legality on their side, but the former ones won19. R dolfo Llopis and his
section never acknowledged the legality of that Conference nor accepted its
resolutions. Finally, the International Socialist brought the discussion to an end by
recognizing the «renewed» PSOE as the unique and legitimate representative of
PSOE’s name.
The dictator’s physical death in 1975 and the transition process towards a
democratic system would open different ways to undertake the future within the
fragmented Spanish socialism. PSOE tried to attract under its name the various
existing socialist parties, the most important of which was the «Partido Socialista
Popular», led by Enrique Tierno Galván. Two parallel processes began at a time:
on the one hand the integration within the PSOE of a series of regional and
provincial parties, with the exception of the Catalan socialists who organized
themselves in the «Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE)» in 1978,
becoming a legally independent party (although linked to PSOE). On the other
hand, the creation of the «Federación de Partidos Socialistas», an electoral
federation of socialist parties led by PSP. The results of the first election of 1977
brought about the merge of PSP and its federation of parties into PSOE in 1978.
Through these processes, PSOE was able to organize its political area by
integrating all the potential contending parties.
Since he achieved power in the party, the figure of Felipe González as the
leader has never been disputed, neither domestically nor abroad. Not even when
he left the Secretariat in the 1979 crisis was there a real possibility that he would
not be reelected in that same year’s Extraordinary Conference. A party ideological
issue caused the crisis: Felipe González did not agree with the decision to
maintain Marxism as the party emblem and decided to resign. But his succession
was not clear, as none of the party leaders who supported the option of
maintaining Marxism in the program wanted to take over the Secretariat. The 28th
Conference and the Extraordinary Conference held in 1979 represented the «Bad-
Godesberg» for Spanish socialism. After the failure in the 1979 general elections,
internal and external party bases were established to make access to Government
possible.
Since 1976, the election of the General Secretary takes place in a
Conference where the Federal Executive Committee and a part of the Federal
Committee (the most important governing body between conferences) are elected.
The delegates attending the Conference are representatives elected in the
Federations’ Conferences (art. 3 of the party statutes). The election of the
governing bodies takes place through the vote of each delegation’s spokesperson
weighted by the members of each federation. Thus the largest federation can
control the adopted resolutions.
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The internal representation of delegates in the conferences has changed
throughout the years. We cannot say they represent the party membership but the
politically active members20, the so-called «inner-circle» of the party. Conference
delegates could be considered as a «snapshot» of the party, but their profile has
changed, with an ever-increasing presence of members holding public elected
offices. To a certain extent, this is logical, as PSOE has won central Government,
the presidency of twelve «Autonomous Communities», and the most important city
councils -the number of socialist councilors being 24,000.
From the outside, Felipe González’s leadership is seen as «the electoral
engine»21 that has dragged the party’s machinery to Government. In a country
where mass media are centered on television, his leadership role has been very
important to get such good electoral results.
We can say that the leader’s influence displaces the selection process.
According to Schonfeld22 we could define González’s figure as that of the
«monocratic leader». The stability within the party since 1979 and the good
electoral results make him an indisputable leader. The potential tensions within
the party, like the Conference debate on the integration in NATO and the following
referendum, have been absorbed through the acknowledgement of different
currents of opinion within the party. The conflict with the socialist trade union,
«Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)», led by Nicolás Redondo, is the only
uncertainty: it is difficult to know how it is going to affect the party, the electorate
and PSOE’s leadership.
SELECTION METHODS USED IN AP
The idea and foundation of AP in October 1976 was the consequence of
the selection process of an executive leadership conceived by a section of the
Francoist political elite. This section decided to start a political convergence
platform in the context of the «pre-party system»23 created in Spain just after
Franco’s death. Five months later, the supporters of all those groups24 approved
this executive committee during the 1st AP Conference.
From that moment onwards, members do the selection in the party
conferences that normally take place once a year in accordance with the party
statutes. The composition, distribution and nomination of delegates vary
throughout the period studied here25: they change from non-fully structured
patterns and methods to a progressive structuring of procedures. The selection
and cooptation mechanisms and the democratic presidential criteria are combined,
implemented alternatively and/or superimposed according to the party’s policy.
3.- Selection Mechanisms and Procedures
The different statutes of the party foresee the possibility to summon
extraordinary conferences; only one extraordinary conference has been called in
these few years, in February 1986, when a new leader had to be elected after
Fraga’s resignation as the party president. In fact, this 7th Conference has been
the only one gathering some competitive elements: there were two candidates to
the party’s presidency and, for the first time, representatives (delegates in the
conference) were elected in local assemblies of party members, through a system
of open lists and with no instructions from the top. Affiliation is considered more
important than electoral results in the provincial distribution of these
representatives. On the other hand it is the only case in which delegates are
known as well as their social and political profiles26. The open list system, that
someone had already tried to introduce after the 2nd Conference in 1979, was used
for the election of the National Executive Committee in the 7th Conference and
introduced in the 8th Conference just for the election of representatives and
national members. Although this is a practice of obtaining votes in exchange for
something it  can balance the presidential effects.
Each of the two candidates represented a meaningful section of the party:
A. Hernández Mancha was a member of AP since its foundation; he was the
regional president of the party in Andalucía and was elected senator by the
members of the Andalucian Autonomous Parliament. His winner candidacy was
supported by different territorial organizations and also by the national mass
media27. His political career followed the party’s recruiting trend.
The other candidate was Miguel Herrero, outstanding member of UCD until
January 1982 when he joined AP after the fateful crisis in his party. Soon after his
integration in the party he became part of AP’s leadership28. T us he represented
the trend developing political action in AP, by starting processes of coalition and
convergence within the Spanish right political spectrum, which implied that
politicians coming from other parties or groups were immediately integrated in
AP’s elite. Herrero also had the support of a section of the party29.
But this selection process just took place in the extraordinary situation
created by Fraga’s resignation and is thus considered unusual. In other
conferences the party’s leader, Manuel Fraga, has been elected being the only
candidate to the presidency. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of selection and
composition of delegates -inborn and elected or co-opted- have changed as well
as the leader’s powers. The ordinary character of the eight conferences celebrated
by AP should be discussed in relation to the 1st and the 9th Conferences, this last
one held in February 1989, both of which could be considered extraordinary.
Once the pre-conference process was started with the usual objectives, the
approval of reports and election, or rather, reelection of the party’s president, the
former leader Manuel Fraga decided to present his candidacy for president as part
of the “re-foundation” process of the party. Thus the conference did not follow the
formal mechanisms and, as usual in AP, took place in two levels, within the party
and outside of it. Also, as usual, the leader impelled the strategy of coalition and
integration of other people and political groups that were superimposed to the
internal mechanisms. The Conference’s rules were reformed three months before
it took place, changing the number and functions of delegates and the statutes’
report in relation to the mechanisms for selecting the leader and his powers.
Fraga was the winner in this confrontation with Hernández Mancha who
withdrew his candidacy two months before the Conference, as it was clear that the
party organization supported Fraga’s option. We must point out the influence
played by Fraga in changing the party’s name at the last moment and with a lot of
opposition within the party (just 1/3 of the delegates agreed to the new name
-«Partido Popular»- and to its Christian Democrat orientation).
After these remarks, we shall now try to analyze the mechanisms of
selection in the other six ordinary conferences in which Fraga was the only
candidate for president. In general, presidentialism was introduced in the 3rd
Conference held in December 1979. It marked the beginning of the process to
formalize the internal organization of the party30 nd became stronger31 in the 5th
Conference (February 1982) that was simultaneous to UCD’s crisis.
The mechanisms and processes of selection have changed throughout
these years. Changes were due to the need of adapting the organizational
apparatus of a mass party with no governmental experience as they reached local
and autonomous governmental bodies through the electoral process.
Thus the number of AP’s members in town councils and parliaments grew at
the same time as they took up responsibility positions in the party’s executive
bodies: the statutes of the party were changed so that members normally became
either inborn delegates or members of the national executive bodies; the inclusion
of the party’s European Parliament members to the party’s leadership is the latest
example of this32. Although it is increasing, the presence and powers of members
of parliament have always been limited to about a third of delegates; this fact has
caused many tensions that are now solved with the new trend to increase their
presence in the party’s leadership33.
In contrast to the inborn delegates, as we have already observed, most of
the selected delegates are members of the party but have no real influence in the
leader’s election and can only approve whatever has been decided beforehand.
The “Consejo Nacional de Dirección” (National Board of Directors - CDN) of
the party is in charge of convening the party’s conferences. Normally, as in most
cases, conferences serve as platforms with external repercussions, instead of
bringing up internal opinions (which in theory is its aim). Once the CDN has set
the criteria for the following conference, its equivalents in the smaller districts must
proceed to select delegates. As happens in most parties, the social and political
profiles of the delegates, as well as the development of the selection process, are
not known to the members of the party. Some questions such as to what extent do
delegates represent the party, what are their ideological profiles, or which is their
degree of identification with the party’s program are impossible to answer because
of these restrictions.
In relation to their political profiles, all we know is that just two thirds of the
delegates are party members since AP’s growth in 1982, an important number of
which hold executive positions within the party. At this moment, we are working on
the ratio between delegates and elected officials and all we can say is that the
number of elected officials is only significant among the inborn delegates. In
relation to the social characteristics, we can point out that the average age of party
members is decreasing, that the number of professionals is diminishing (liberal
professionals and managers are disappearing), and that the number of students
and middle class members is increasing. The territorial distribution of delegates is
related to formal variables that are given in the statutes. In general, we can assert
-formally at least, that the criteria that have governed the composition and
distribution of delegates follow the strategy that intends to strengthen the
organizational structure of the party.
The distribution of delegates in provinces takes into account two factors.
One is related to the party organization: number of members, councils and
headquarters; and the other is an external factor, based on the electoral results. A
mathematical formula combines both criteria giving more importance to one or the
other in each stage of the process: first, the electoral variable (number of votes
and of elected officials) is more significant; secondly, the variable related to
organization (members and headquarters) has more weight. We must not forget
though that, in practice, the elected members increase the volume of inborn
delegates and become part of AP’s leadership.
4.- Membership, Leadership and Local Headquarters
The process to strengthen the inner party organization started, as we have
pointed out, during the 3rd National Conference and involved both the human and
organizational bases, in the attempt to restrain some frauds in territorial
organizations by increasing their participation in the party structure. As the number
of delegates and the composition of some territorial bodies (provincial and
regional councils) depended on the degree of influence on the territory and on the
number of party members, control of new membership and withdrawals took place
in Madrid since 1983. This measure may have been effective and contributed to a
greater transparency of the whole process but its real significance is limited
because of the little influence delegates have in the selection of the leader and of
other executive bodies. Besides the election of the «Comité Ejecutivo Nacional»
(Executive National Committee - CEN) from open lists, at the 7th Conference, the
function of delegates was reduced to ratify the election of closed candidacies
proposed by Fraga and accepted by a relative majority.
Nevertheless and even though the scope of these mechanisms is limited,
we can think of their effects in the party as cohesive elements that complement the
role of the leader. This is the only way of understanding the role of this kind of
mid-level elite in keeping the party together.
There is no doubt that these hypotheses can be enriched through
discussion with conclusions drawn from other studies.
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